The Varieties of Causal Experience

Michael over at Archive-Fire has a new post up distinguishing his notion of epistemic withdrawal from Harman’s ontological withdrawal. While claiming to hold tight to an embodied account of mind, Michael nonetheless wants to carve out a distinction between two kinds of interaction: mental and physical. Mental interaction is always detached and abstract due to its linguistic and imaginal intangibility, while physical interaction is direct because it involves structural contact between entities. Michael accepts the generally Kantian construal of the real as existing forever beyond human knowledge: things withdraw absolutely, but only from our knowledge. Physically, when I grab my coffee mug, the atoms in my fingers are in direct physical contact with the electrons orbiting the atoms of which it is composed. Such physical relations, according to Michael, are causal, while mental relations are symbolic.

I discussed the difference between realism and materialism in this post last week. I affirmed an organic realism, and tried to explain why I reject both materialism and idealism, since each seems self-contradictory on its own. Follow the former to its final conclusions and you end up with the latter, and vice versa [For example, if our knowledge is forever limited, when we speak of the electron orbitals of atoms, are we not speaking of our conceptual models of matter, rather than matter in itself? If we can't know what matter really is, what justifies our speaking of direct contact? Isn't this just a subtle form of idealism?]. Michael describes his position as a kind of non-reductive materialism, leaning on the concept of emergence to account for mentality. I find emergence an indispensable concept for understanding evolutionary leaps like that from molecules to cells, or from single cells to multicellular life; but these are examples of organizational/structural emergence. I do not think emergence can account for mind in an otherwise merely material universe (“merely” material as in not the prehensive matter of Whiteheadian ontology). The emergence of mind would not simply represent the emergence of a more complex organizational structure, but an entirely new ontological domain. Is it really sufficient to say that mind emerges from otherwise insensate matter simply because that matter is structurally organized in a new way? I am unconvinced.

Instead of defining mind as essentially a linguistic phenomenon, as Michael does, I’d suggest that mind is primarily affective in nature. That is, thinking is an especially refined kind of feeling (a feeling of feelings, if you will). Rather than separate cognition and causality, I’d follow Whitehead’s illuminating distinction between “presentational immediacy” and “causal efficacy.” Whitehead critiques Hume’s account of sensory experience using this distinction: Hume’s analysis of his experience of, say, a glass cup in terms of raw sensory universals like “whiteness,” “roundness,” etc., Whitehead argues is actually derived from a more fundamental, causal mode of experience. Hume’s analysis of sensory experience remains on the level of “presentational immediacy,” which for Whitehead is a very rare, high grade mode of experience especially perfected by reflective, language-using human beings. Most of the time, we interact with the world via bodily perception, which is to say, we feel the causal force of the world directly and respond without having to break up that world into its raw sensory components. Hume’s analysis of experience is too abstract, which is why he ends up having to jettison causality all together. Whitehead notes Hume’s realization that we see the cup with our eyes, suggesting that he was close to grasping the causal efficacy of the body. But alas, Hume did not think through the implications of the causal efficacy of his body, the way causation was the condition making possible his abstract analysis of experience in terms of sensory universals. [See this post for a more in depth account of Whitehead's response to Hume].

“Mind” and “matter” are dreadfully vague words, but when I speak of “mind” above, I am referring to everything from sensuality to conceptuality. Mind is anything that requires awareness. Surely, there are forms of awareness that are not linguistic. The feeling of another’s gaze, or of the wind moving the hair across your forehead, for instance. On the other hand, from the perspective of a pansemiotic paradigm (Peirce, or more recently, Hoffmeyer), all relations could be construed as sign interpretation.

Michael mentions Whitehead’s panpsychism as one of Harman’s “background assumptions,” but I don’t think its quite fair to call this an assumption. On the contrary, adopting some varient of panpsychism is the result of much conceptual struggle with mind-matter dualism.

Knowledge takes place at the level of abstract significations. And signification involves very different processes than those involved in basic physical interactions.

This has been a standard distinction since at least Descartes. But when faced with the intractable issue of having to account for mind, or even just basic sensation, in a universe otherwise composed of dead matter, what is to prevent us from re-thinking our ontology (a la Whitehead)? I’ve offered some reasons for rejecting the emergentist account of mind; I’d be curious to know Michael’s reasons for rejecting the panexperientialist account.

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7 thoughts on “The Varieties of Causal Experience

      • Apologies. I never say your question, Matt. I will respond here and on my blog.

        I, and pragmatists in general, deny the “generally Kantian construal of the real as existing forever beyond human knowledge.” Let me summarize the Kantian problem to summarize the rejection. For Kant, the real is “out there,” while the meaningful is “in here,” and never shall the two meet. The external world is real independent of human experience, and the universal forms/rules/categories of human understanding are internal to human nature. Cross-reference the whole dance about space being empirically real and transcendentally ideal; we must experience the world that way and it is an a priori condition, but those conditions are internal to human and not attributable to supra-human nature. The problem with this account is that it places the categories of the understanding internal and relative to human nature as opposed to nature. Why is this a problem? Because it is both an unfounded and inadvisable assumption. Why radically oppose nature vs. nature? Or is human nature something over-and-against nature? It should not be construed as such, but that is precisely what modernist notions of human nature assume.

        Matt asks “is it really sufficient to say that mind emerges from otherwise insensate matter simply because that matter is structurally organized in a new way?” Before I respond, I would insist that “insensate matter” is already loading the question, because it presumes an originary distinction between the sensate and insensate. Why does this matter? Because we need to avoid treating mind as a singular or complex potentiality of matter (existence) that is just waiting to be realized. Now to respond to the question, although I do not think structural organization is sufficient, my question is why not? If we accept structural causation as I do, then we are saying that existential structures can be generative of unforeseen potentialities. I would also add that potentiality simpliciter is integral; potentialities can combine to create novel potentialities given local conditions. Hence, it is no just structure, but the existential locale and cosmic epoch that matter. (The epoch matters because the natural laws are understood to be habits, law-like, and not absolute; nature and the cosmos evolves.) I have blog much on this topic.

        I would agree with Matt that “thinking is an especially refined kind of feeling,” although I mean that in a Deweyan sense not reducible to Peirce or Whitehead. I could explain, but if asked I will first try to find a blog post. The model here diverges quite a bit. I would also agree with Matt that “consciousness” (awareness) is not foremost linguistic or cognitive, and that it stretches from sensuality and affectivity to conceptuality.

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