

## LA COSMOLOGIE TRANSCENDANTALE DE WHITEHEAD: LA TRANSFORMATION SPECULATIVE DU CONCEPT DE CONSTRUCTION LOGIQUE

“Whitehead’s Transcendental Cosmology: The Speculative Transformation of the Concept of Logical Construction”

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*SUMMARY: Whitehead is unusual among modern theorists of event or difference in maintaining the possibility of a categorial and analogical analysis of becoming in the rationalist manner. However, this does not make him the metaphysical realist he is often thought to be. By means of a redefinition of his own early concept of “logical construction,” he transforms the nature and status of the traditional apparatus of metaphysical analysis, combining pre- and post-Kantian thought in a unique way.*

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### I

The history of modern philosophy is primarily a history of the concept of immanence. But while Kant's immanent methodology and the immanent metaphysics of the post-Kantian idealists were both tied to the concept of a complete or realized reality (as *Noumenon* or *Absolute*), with Nietzsche and Bergson the concept of immanence opposes the complete and realized real, in all its forms; since then, this has become one of the central characteristics of twentieth-century philosophy.

From the last years of the nineteenth century, that is, as long as Kant's immanent methodology remains the guiding principle both in Bergson's psychology and in the perspectivism or situationism which, in one way or another, is a feature of the way post-Nietzschean thinkers understand themselves, everywhere the concept of the real as complete or realized is rejected, regardless of how one understands it, [4] in terms of the realm of forms as eternal repetition of the identical, or as divine nature as *causa sui* and *causa omnium rerum*, or as the noumenal thing-in-itself which lies beyond knowledge, or the absolute totality. Besides Nietzsche's creative moment and the qualitatively diverse successions of Bergson's duration, the most obvious examples of this way of thinking are Whitehead's process of occasions, the *Ereignis* of the late Heidegger, Adorno's negative dialectics, and Deleuze's repetition of the different.

But as for the concept of a complete or realized reality, whether it is affirmed primarily in epistemological and anthropological terms or in more universal, metaphysical or cosmological terms (the history of many of these thinkers is the history of their journey from the former to the latter), one tends to replace it everywhere with the concept of the real understood in a pluralistic way according to how the natures of things actualize and differentiate themselves, and one usually attributes to it an intrinsically temporal character. Time is understood not as an identical structure of "nows," a pre-existing container in which things happen, but as the way things actualize themselves. As a result, the real is perceived as nothing else than the immanent becoming of unique and new events or singularities, each of which is both the subject and object of itself, constituting internally its own order and character. Thus one can say that philosophical discourse is no longer expressed in terms of any kind of persisting reality of which events are the predicates, but in terms of new events actualizing themselves, of which the persisting realities are the predicates.<sup>1</sup>

This reversal of the relationship between "objects" and events generates another characteristic trait of recent philosophy: the critique of philosophical representation. For if the real is a matter of unique events, there is no special reality and the real is also not a matter of identical, fundamental structures that philosophy would have to represent. Philosophical concepts are therefore not the articulation of an order of things given in advance. They are no longer intermediaries between the self and the world, serving to express the intrinsic nature of the self or to

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<sup>1</sup> An excellent analysis of this transformation can be found in A.W. MURPHY's "Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead," *Philosophical Review* 36, 1927, pp. 121-144. See also "Reason and the Common Good: Selected Essays of A. W. Murphey", edited by W.H. Hay and M.G. Singer, New Jersey, pp. 163-167.

present that of the world. Rather, they must be understood as modes of self-actualization, identities of form and content.

By redefining meaning in terms of the advent of particular events, or as being itself an event of differentiation, [5] the identity of meaning and being is ensured independently of any kind of complete and realized real. Philosophical discourse is now no longer about the abstract identity of objects but about the qualitative difference of events.

In this context, it is not surprising that the nature of philosophical discourse since Nietzsche and Bergson is often difficult. Nietzsche's telegraphic aphorisms, Bergson's recognized inadequate "metaphors," Heidegger's deliberately gnomic, non-systematizable Sagen [sayings], Adorno's self-negative dialectic, Deleuze's concept of the univocity of being as difference, all are constructed to evacuate their propositional content in the face of the singularities they articulate. These thinkers begin with the paradox: one disturbs, declassifies, modifies the direction, which allows the universality of reason to bring into play its own limitations in the face of the unique and new differences that it thus very clearly manifests. Only Whitehead stands apart from the obsessive "paradoxology" of modernity; with his massive categorical apparatus confidently employed to rationally analyze self-actualization, his discourse, despite all its neologisms, remains quite distinct from the dominant strategies of self-canceling discourse. In his work, there is no tension between the critique of representation - which he undertakes in terms of an attack on subject-predicate logic - and the elaboration of a complex "speculative scheme" of categories. But the strange, surprising character of his thought from this point of view only serves to underline the general situation. In each case, philosophical discourse confronts the questions raised by the problem of its own nature and status in the context of immanent difference.

## II

The concern for self-actualization coupled with the critique of representation gives rise to three questions. First, there is the question that concerns what can be called the philosophical universal: what is the status of the assertion of the primacy of self-actualization or difference? In other words, what is the universal content of the concept of difference or event? How can it be both the principle of reflection and that in terms of which reflection undertakes to criticize representation?

Yet the concept of difference cannot be clearly described as being metaphysically idealistic or metaphysically realistic, or nominalist, according to the usual meanings of these terms. But it is also clear that, in a surprising way, this does indeed constitute a description of the real nature of things. Thus, the question of the philosophical universal gives rise to a second question, the question of philosophical realism. [6] What kind of realism is involved in the concept of self-actualizing differences? If it cannot fit into the usual classifications of the philosophical universal as a concept of the real, how should we understand the concept of the real as difference or event?

This second question in turn produces a third: how can the universal claims of a theory of difference be compatible with the fact that such a theory must define itself as a difference or mode of difference among others? How is it possible to hold at the same time these claims to truth and its own definition as a particular occasion or finite event? What concept of reality is at issue here, which can be fallibilistic in reference to itself? To Kant's "weak" critical concept of the limits of knowledge has been added in subsequent philosophy the "strong" critical concept of the historically situated or historical perspective of reflection. The second includes and satisfies the first; the question is now whether the second can satisfactorily include the intrinsic consistency that it itself demands.

In truth each of these three questions implies a reference to oneself. What kind of universal is difference? That is to say: how can such a concept constitute a theory of the real? And how can such a theory affirm its own truth? Each question revolves around the other, and these are the questions around which much of our philosophy revolves, constantly asking: what are philosophical affirmations when there are no fundamentally identical structures that can be represented by philosophy? As Whitehead poses to himself the difficulty within the context of his analysis of occasions, in terms of "forms of process" (a risky and characteristically clever phrase, which seeks to clarify what is at issue and indicate what one wishes to accomplish in this regard):

From this doctrine (of forms of process), a difficult problem arises. How can we justify the notion of some general value of reasoning? Indeed, if the process depends on individuals, it varies according to the differences of individuals. Consequently, what has been said of one process cannot be said of another

process. The same difficulty is encountered concerning the notion of the identity of an individual conceived as implicated in different processes. Our doctrine seems to have destroyed the very foundation of rationality (MT 133).<sup>2</sup>

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### III

Of course, it is unusual to suggest that Whitehead, like the continental European theorists of the event, is troubled by questions of philosophical universality.

First, there is the dominant Anglo-American idea, which is hardly questioned, that Whitehead is a traditional metaphysical realist whose work must be understood in terms of the philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries. Because, in *Process and Reality*, he says his position is "a return to pre-Kantian modes of thought" (PR xi), it has been assumed, from Dewey to Rorty<sup>3</sup>, that his occasions are minute, imperceptible existents - an assumption reinforced by the strongly realistic language he characteristically employs when he defines occasions as "the really real things which ... compose the evolving universe" (MT 206) and designates them as primary "categories of existence" (PR 22). Therefore, it is not surprising that, in the Anglophone world, most philosophers view his writings, from *Process and Reality* onward, as simply anachronisms - a situation exacerbated by the fact that academics, especially Americans, who call themselves "Whiteheadians," uphold a kind of pre-Kantian metaphysical realism of a pan-psyche nature<sup>4</sup> completely contrary to Whitehead's emphases in this area.<sup>5</sup> It is unfortunate that, in Anglo-American philosophy, no one has yet taken seriously Russell's caustic remark about *Process and Reality*, saying that Whitehead "has always had a penchant for Kant."<sup>6</sup>

Secondly, while the striking resemblance of Whitehead's thought to that of the European theorists of the event regarding particular questions and themes has not been ignored, particularly in France<sup>7</sup>, there has never been an attempt to fully understand the fact that, in [8] Whitehead, reason is in no way embarrassed by the otherness of the event, the categorical impulse is not suppressed as a narcissistic attempt by metaphysics to dissolve the multiplicity of the different by elaborating a complete reality. Little attention has been paid to the fact that Whitehead emphatically asserts - in contrast to the strategists of paradox - that his metaphysics is a naturalistic metaphysics, a rationalist empiricism (cf. PR 42) which unabashedly professes a "philosophical method" (AI chap. xv) which is explicitly of an analogical character (cf. MT 134-135, 231-232; PR chap. 1; AI chap. xv) and involves the elaboration of a complex scheme of "generic" categories (PR 110) for the analysis of self-actualization.<sup>8</sup> Whereas,

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<sup>2</sup> Abbreviations used in reference to WHITEHEAD's works: UA = *A Treatise on Universal Algebra*, Cambridge University Press, 1898; AE = *The Aims of Education and Other Essays* (1932), 2nd. ed., Ernest BeM, London, 1950; RM = *Religion in the Making*, Cambridge University Press, 1926; FR = *The Function of Reason*, Princeton University Press, 1929; PR = *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (1929), corrected edition, The Free Press, New York, 1978; AI = *Adventures of Ideas*, Cambridge University Press, 1933; MT = *Modes of Thought*, Cambridge University Press, 1938; ESP = *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1947.

<sup>3</sup> See John DEWEY, "Whitehead's Philosophy", *Philosophical Review* 46, 1937, pp. 170-177; Richard RORTY, "The Subjectivist Principle and the Linguistic Turn" in *A.N. Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy*, ed. G. Kline, New Jersey, 1963, pp. 134-157. These are just two very distinguished and interesting examples of the common way, in England and the United States, of considering Whitehead as a metaphysical realist.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Charles HARTSHORNE, *Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays 1935-1970*. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1972, chap. III.

<sup>5</sup> See Victor Lowe, "The Concept of Experience in Whitehead's Metaphysics", in G. KLINE, op. cit., p. 124-133, especially p. 126.

<sup>6</sup> Bertrand RUSSELL, *Autobiography*, Vol. 1, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1975, chap. V, p. 129.

<sup>7</sup> See especially Jean WAHL, *Towards the Concrete*, Vrin, Paris, 1932, p. 127-221; J.-C. DUMONCEL, "Whitehead or the torrential cosmos", *Archives de Philosophie* 41, 1984, p. 569-589, 48, 1985, p. 59-78; Gilles DELEUZE, *The Fold*, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1988, p. 103-112. In Germany, see for example Reiner WIEHL, "Time and Timelessness in the Philosophy of A.M. Whitehead", in *Nature and History: Karl Löwith on his 70th birthday*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1967, p. 373-405.

<sup>8</sup> In general, it has not been well recognized that Whitehead's methodology, in particular his emphasis on analogy, owes much to the philosophy of science developed at Trinity College Cambridge by his colleague N.R. Campbell. Cf. N.R. CAMPBELL, *Physics. The Elements*, Cambridge University Press, 1921, reprinted *The Foundations of Science*, Dover Books, New York, 1957. On Campbell, cf. the article by Gerd BUCHDAHL in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards, Macmillan, New York, 1967. On analogy in Whitehead, cf. Dorothy EMMET, *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*, Macmillan, London, 1945.

since Bergson, the European theorists of the event have assumed that the categorical reason of metaphysics is indissolubly linked to the traditional concept of a closed, complete mathematical system, modeled on Euclidean geometry, an attitude well described by Bergson noting that universal mathematics are the "chimera of modern philosophy,"<sup>9</sup> Whitehead, for his part, would like to associate mathematics with the characteristically anti-rationalist concept of self-actualization through a transposed algebra rather than a transposed geometry (cf. ESP 97 sq.). Furthermore, for him, the "generalized mathematics" (ESP 109), resulting from the extension of "the algebraic method" (cf. ESP 127 sq.), are a new way of recovering "the logical attitude of the time of St. Thomas Aquinas" (ESP 131) - in stark contrast to the orientation towards Scotus characteristic of event theorists such as Heidegger or Deleuze.

In fact, in a way quite different from that of the paradox strategists, Whitehead announces, as a program, that "the task of philosophy is to show the fusion of analysis and actuality" (ESP 113): he would like to develop a mode of analysis, a concept of philosophical universality, capable of being both "the expression of necessity" (ESP 128) and the articulation of "the creative advance into novelty" (PR 349). This means that his theory is a theory of difference that, [9] unusually, would hold "the right balance of atomism and continuity," "particle and wave, particularity and connectivity" (PR 36). As he says, "the cross of philosophy is to maintain the balance between the individuality of existence and the relativity of existence" (ESP 111).

The best way to define what is at stake here is perhaps to consider that Whitehead and the strategists of paradox diverge on three questions that the latter believe to be inseparably linked to the critique of representation.

Firstly, the strategists of paradox reject the notion of a philosophical scheme of categories. This notion, in fact, seems to be inextricably engaged in suppressing the different, the new, as it defines the real in terms of the identity of concepts. To affirm that the order of thought reflects the order of the real inevitably leads, it is believed, to subsume contingency and singularity under structures of rational necessity understood as essentially complete and unchanging. If the concepts of events were to designate nothing more than what is philosophically indeterminable, they would not be concepts of differences, but descriptions of a fixed, invariable model, where creative novelty is obliterated under the identity of rational structure. As a result, categories of thought are abandoned as components of the apparatus of representation in favor of Heidegger's "poetry of thought", Adorno's concrete dialectic of the particular or Deleuze's acategorical thought.<sup>10</sup>

Secondly, the strategists of paradox characteristically reject the analogical method of philosophical analysis. For example, the later Heidegger, recognizing that Nietzsche has rediscovered the metaphorical character of concepts for German philosophy, admits that "a model is that from which thought must necessarily start."<sup>11</sup> But, just as Nietzsche's "mobile army of metaphors" only brings instruments for the creation of the moment, so the later Heidegger emphasizes that "ontic models... are employed and destroyed in these writings," explicitly in the manner of a strict "negative theology"; affirmations become apophatic gestures in the face of the impenetrable alterity of difference.<sup>12</sup>

However, given that Heidegger's voluminous writings on Thomas Aquinas are not yet public, the most direct [10] and pointed critiques of the analogical method must be found in Deleuze.<sup>13</sup> He rejects the analogy of attribution - where in the "order of research" a term belonging to the creature such as "good" is attributed by analogy to the uncreated being of God, while at the same time in the "order of reality" it is properly defined as being attributed first to an analogue, God, and only secondarily to the other, i.e., to creatures - because the resembling series is considered

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Whitehead's methodology was also influenced quite early by F. H. BRADLEY, *The Principles of Logic*, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1883 (cf. UA, preface). Cf. especially Bradley's treatment of hypothetical judgment, working hypothesis, and ideal experiment, concepts that Whitehead historicizes in PR chap. 1 and AI chap. xv.

<sup>9</sup> H. BERGSON, "Introduction to Metaphysics", Thought and the Moving, PUF, Paris, 1934, p. 103.

<sup>10</sup> See in particular M. HEIDEGGER, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Verlag Gunther Neske, Pfullingen, 1959; T.W. ADORNO, *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1970; Gilles DELEUZE, *Difference et Repetition*, PUF, Paris, 1968; and, on the latter, M. FOUCAULT, "Theatrum philosophicum", *Critique* 282, 1970, p. 885-908.

<sup>11</sup> M. HEIDEGGER, *On the Matter of Thinking*, Max. Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1969, p. 54.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. HEIDEGGER, *ibid.*, p. 51; see p. 27 for a more developed analysis of the connections and contrasts between the thought of Whitehead and that of Heidegger. See my article "Whitehead, Heidegger and the Paradoxes of the New", *Process Studies* 20, 1992, no. 3, p. 123-150.

<sup>13</sup> See Gilles DELEUZE, *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 44-61. 345-349.

by him as representing, to varying degrees, an eminent term or eminent perfection, which is understood as the productive principle of reality behind the series. He also rejects the analogy of proportionality - here it is a matter of correspondence between relations (as *a* is to *b*, so *c* is to *d*) and not of similar terms - for the reason that it makes mimetic representation itself the principle and structure of the complete real.<sup>14</sup> In both cases the objection is metaphysical - not just procedural - in that the analogical method is, it is thought, irretrievably linked to a concept of complete and realized reality in which all things participate and of which all things are a representation.

Thirdly, it is with the intention of short-circuiting the analogical and categorical tradition of the metaphysics of representation that Deleuze, like Heidegger before him, resorts to the Scotist doctrine of the univocity of being, that is, affirming that the concept of being, in all its uses, has an identical (non-analogical) meaning.

What exactly is at issue in the debate between Aquinas and Scotus on this point? This is a complex and difficult question. But the reason why Deleuze is interested in the concept of the univocity of being is quite clear: he sees that this concept offers the possibility of a non-eminent, totally immanent, analysis of experience, a possibility which, he asserts, has been realized since Scotus in a specific counter-philosophical tradition.

Deleuze considers that the "univocalist" tradition has three main "moments" represented by the work of Scotus, that of Spinoza, and that of Nietzsche, with Nietzsche being seen here as sharing characteristics with Bergson and Heidegger.<sup>15</sup> He follows the development of the concept of the univocity of being, going from Scotus, where being is what opposes nothingness, through Spinoza's single immanent substance, to Nietzsche for whom being is nothing other than a matter of difference. Obviously the crucial step is the introduction of difference; once identity or univocity is defined only as difference, the univocalist tradition is detached from any involvement in thinking of a multiplicity [11] by reference to identity, i.e., the enterprise of representing a complete or realized reality of any kind. In the univocal concept of being as difference, the universality of the concept of being directly affirms the particularity of difference as difference, and not as the representation of a prior identity through the distorting mediation of categories or analogical concepts.

However, it would be wrong to say that Whitehead's work implies any rejection of the concept of univocity of being as difference. This is absolutely not necessary; for reasons that will become apparent, Whitehead can consider that the concept of the univocity of being as difference is another way of affirming the primacy of new events. But it's just another way and nothing more. For, contrary to the European theorists of the event, Whitehead explicitly denies that categorical and analogical analysis - philosophical methods that the concept of the univocity of being as difference would want to abandon - are inseparably linked to the complete reality of the metaphysics of representation. Indeed, he would consider such a view as another example of the "paralogism of the method which consists of putting aside"; he gives a very precise description of it: it often tacitly assumes

that, if there can be an intellectual analysis, it must proceed according to some discarded dogmatic method and deduce from it that the intellect is intrinsically linked to erroneous fictions. This kind is illustrated by the anti-intellectualism of Nietzsche and Bergson and affects American pragmatism (AI 287).<sup>16</sup>

By contrast, Whitehead's own work is a massive, self-conscious appropriation and redefinition of categorical and analogical analysis in the context of a theory of immanent difference.

The key question is obviously: how does Whitehead do this? How is he able to disengage categorical analysis from the critique of representation? Such an unusual undertaking can only be understood by considering his work again in the context of the tradition of categorical-analogical analysis in which it is situated. For this, it will be useful to briefly examine three significant moments in the history of categorical analysis, three moments that have crucial importance in the categorical definition of the philosophical universe.

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<sup>14</sup> See Gilles DELEUZE and Felix GUATIARI, *A Thousand Plateaus*, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1980, chap. x.

<sup>15</sup> See Gilles DELEUZE, *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 57-61.

<sup>16</sup> These are prophetic insights compared to recent developments in neo-pragmatism: for an openly anti-rational elaboration of the concept of self-actualization in a pragmatic context, see Richard RORTY, *Contingency, Irony, Solidarity*, Cambridge University Press, 1989. I tried to indicate the general character and significance of this work in my article "Richard Rorty and the Image of Modernity", *The Heythrop Journal* 32, 1991, p. 249-253.

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#### IV

The first moment in the categorical history of the philosophical universal is, in my opinion, best represented in the work of Thomas Aquinas. As commonly understood, he distinguishes three types of distinctions through which the relationship between objects and their concepts can be analyzed.

The first type of distinction is purely "logical" or "mental," a distinction like the one between terms such as "seat" and "chair" or between "person" and "human being," where the objects themselves do not offer any inherent distinction in relation to these terms.

The second kind of distinction is a "real distinction," which can be of two kinds. First, there are real distinctions in physically composite entities that, as such, have physically separable parts (for example, the distinction between two hands). Second, there are real distinctions in metaphysically composite entities where the distinguished features are understood within the context of a particular metaphysical description. These entities may have a kind of real being independently of each other if they are not separate (for example, the distinction between form and matter, between soul and body), or they may be distinct from each other even if they are inseparable from each other (for example, the distinction between essence and existence, or between soul, thought, and will, which correspond to distinct extra-mental realities without being able to exist separately from each other).

The third type of distinction is known as a "virtual" or "metaphysical" distinction. A virtual distinction is more than a logical distinction because it provides information about the nature of its object, but it is less than a real distinction, meaning that there are no extra-mental features or real distinctions in the object corresponding to it. This means that a virtual distinction is only currently distinct in the mind, but it nevertheless expresses genuine, real characteristics of the object as apprehended by the mind in its relationship to it.

For example, it is acknowledged that this type of distinction defines the character of finite human apprehension of the infinity of God. Although the nature of God is pure unity or simplicity, it is believed that God can be truly described by a plurality of attributes such as "wise," "good," "just," not because these would be different traits within His nature corresponding to these distinctions, but because the infinite nature of God requires to be thought of and can only be thought of by finite minds in this way. Thus, the divine attributes are necessary distinctions or descriptions. In the perspective of the finite mind or the standpoint of intellectual analysis, they are true of their object, but there is nothing in [13] their object that corresponds to them. They can be called virtual realities. It should also be noted that terms such as "wise" or "good," which we only know within the limits of finite human experience, nonetheless have a positive meaning when attributed to the infinite being because they are attributed analogically, according to the analogies of attribution and proportionality.

However, in the context of the question of the philosophical universal, the most important use of the concept of virtual distinction pertains to what are called the "transcendental properties of being." For our purposes here, we can take them as concepts of "being" (ens), "thing" (res), "unity" (unum), and "distinction" (aliquid). They are called "transcendental" because they transcend all kinds, and they are the "transcendental properties of being" because they can be predicated of everything that is: thus, everything that is, is "being," "something," is "unity," and is "distinct from another."

These properties of being are not real distinctions in being because they are one and the same thing as being (or, to put it differently, they all have being). But they are also not purely logical distinctions. Each one designates a different trait or characteristic of being, a trait or characteristic implied by the other without being identical to it. That is why they are virtual distinctions. They are true of everything that is, but they are distinct only in the mind; that is, there are no distinct features in being corresponding to them, but they are virtually necessary descriptions of being by virtue of how the mind must think.

As will be seen, the series of transformations subsequently undergone by the concept of the transcendental as virtual or real entities is the key that opens up the question of the philosophical universal in modern philosophy.

The second moment in the categorical history of the philosophical universal is found in Kant's transcendental philosophy. Kant, like Hume, acknowledges the existence of empirical knowledge. Where Kant differs from Hume is in the explanation of empirical knowledge. With Kant, the transcendental analysis of being becomes the transcendental analysis of the conditions for the possible knowledge of objects. What does this change imply?

The transcendental conditions for possible knowledge are not purely logical distinctions, either in the sense that they are distinctions solely in the mind that tell us nothing about the nature of empirical knowledge or empirical experience, or in a broader sense, like logic, where they abstract from the content of knowledge and deal only with its formal relations. [14]

Rather, transcendental analysis "deals with the origin of the modes by which we know objects" (CPR A55/B80). It follows that the transcendental conditions are not real distinctions because there is nothing in the objects that corresponds to them. They are not traits, ingredients, or contents of the objects, but rather (cognitive) conditions of the objects.

However, this does not mean that the transcendental conditions can be located not in the objects but in the minds, as ingredients of a different kind. Firstly, the transcendental conditions are conditions that make possible the distinction between the mind and the world. Secondly, placing the transcendental conditions in the mind as a framework or scheme imposed on the "world" would render the transcendental conditions "subjective," whereas the essence of transcendental analysis is to guarantee an "empirical realism" (CPR A371).

When defining the status of transcendental conditions as philosophical universals, other considerations regarding the concept of possibility must be taken into account. For Kant, as for pre-Kantians, the real is the realization of the possible. However, Kant redefines the possible in terms of a set of (cognitive) conditions for realization. This means, first of all, that, unlike traditional concepts of possibility, the transcendental conditions are not what is realized because they are the conditions for realization. What is realized are empirical knowledge within which the transcendental categories are the conditions. Therefore, the transcendental conditions and empirical knowledge should not be understood as situated in either of the two usual relations between the possible and the actual. These two relations are resemblance and limitation (resemblance will be discussed later<sup>17</sup>). However, it should already be clear that empirical conditions cannot be understood as limitations of the transcendental conditions of possibility, such that some could be considered realized and others excluded from realization. The philosophical universality of transcendental conditions of possibility must be interpreted very differently.

Perhaps the best way to analyze the nature of transcendental conditions as philosophical universals is to say that they should not be understood as transcendental properties of being. The best way to indicate this difference is to note that Kant does not have a theory of universals in the medieval sense. For him, philosophy does not consist in defining the relations of universals and [15] particulars, concepts and objects; rather, it deals with the conditions that make possible the knowledge of universals and particulars, concepts and objects, that is, the conditions that make such distinctions possible. Thus, as he says, he is concerned not with the transcendental predicates of things but with what is required for the knowledge of things and their predicates (CPR B114).

One can state what Kant affirms as follows: "Suppose there is empirical knowledge of objects, then accounting for the conditions of possibility of knowledge must necessarily include the following features...". This means that transcendental "necessity" is a matter of conceptual requirements imposed on analysis by its perspective or orientation, by the "problems" it considers, the problem of empirical knowledge. The transcendental requirement is always formulated as follows: "The fact that there is empirical knowledge means that there are forms of intuition, categories, unity of apperception, etc.".

From this perspective, it is evident that, as Kant was well aware, the concept of transcendental conditions of possible knowledge constitutes a new aspect of philosophical universality. The transcendental conditions are not purely formal or logical concepts, nor are they any kind of "real" entities; they are conceptual necessities or virtualities of analysis. This means that the transcendental conditions are considered to be true of empirical experience because

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<sup>17</sup> I am indebted to Gilles Deleuze, *Le Bergsonisme*, PUF, Paris, 2nd edition, 1968, pages 99-100.

they are claimed to be the way empirical knowledge must be analyzed. However, not only are there no corresponding traits outside of the mind, as was the case with medieval transcendentals, but they are also in no way traits or aspects of empirical experience. They are best described as not being virtual properties of things but as virtual concepts or conditions of things. Kant's merit lies in redefining virtual distinction in terms of the conditions for the possible knowledge of things and their properties, rather than as properties of things.

So how does Kant justify the claim of critical philosophy to a virtual or transcendental necessity? I would suggest that he does so in terms of the possibility of translation, meaning that what analysis seeks to demonstrate is a relation of possibility of translation between the transcendental construction and the empirical condition. In other words, analysis aims to show that cognitive experience can be entirely translated into the transcendental concepts of the forms of intuition, categories, ideas, unity of apperception, etc., where this translation contains no empirical element and says equivalent things but not the same things concerning the subject in question, as far as this can be affirmed empirically.

However, we are not at the end of the story. It seems to me that conceptual translation depends on establishing an analogical connection [16] between the categorical scheme and its empirical content. This means that when transcendental conditions claim to be the conditions for possible knowledge, it is based on a relation of analogical correspondence between these conditions and empirical knowledge (a relation that includes the contrasting advantages of transcendental analysis compared to different theories).

The nature of this analogical relation can be considered here as belonging to one of the two types of analogical reasoning mentioned earlier. On one hand, in order to have an explanatory status, transcendental conditions of knowledge must analogically resemble or correspond to the different features that constitute empirical knowledge (sensation, space, time, causality, system, etc.). Therefore, in the "order of inquiry," the conditioned character is attributed to the conditions. On the other hand, however, the explanatory character of transcendental conditions of knowledge lies in the fact that they are understood as the foundational or productive principles of the empirically known world. Thus, in the "order of reality," the character of the conditions is attributed to the conditioned. I suggest, therefore, that it is this mutual attributive resemblance of terms that demonstrates the conceptual necessity or virtuality of transcendental conditions as dynamic principles of empirical knowledge.<sup>18</sup> One can say that the philosophical concept of the real in Kant must be understood as the analogically attributive adaptation of the two aspects of analysis, the transcendental and the empirical. In reading Kant, one must recognize that neither side can cross the line of virtuality that separates them. However, it should be noted that there is a significant tension in Kant's critical philosophy between the virtuality of transcendental conditions and their productive function. A virtual dynamic is either too conceptual to fulfill the productive role or too dynamic to be virtual. It is a power that seeks a locus, a [17] philosophical sense of place. To preserve the dynamic, German post-Kantians place it in the complete reality as the Absolute. Thus, just like Thomistic and Kantian analyses, they also deal with the representation of the identical structures of experience. For Thomas Aquinas, these structures are understood with reference to God as the creator, that is, as the foundation of everything that exists. In Kant's case, these identical structures are the transcendental conditions themselves, understood as the productive principles of the empirical world. However, in the third moment of philosophical universality, the concept of founding or realizing power disappears entirely.

## VI

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<sup>18</sup> I am trying to specify the kind of resemblance that exists between the condition and the conditioned, which is at the core of any transcendental analysis of consciousness, as indicated by Deleuze (*Logic of Sense*, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1969, "Quinzieme Serie"). The relation of resemblance could perhaps be analyzed in terms of the analogy of "expressed resemblance" (Bonaventure), which would better articulate the structural character of Kant's analysis. However, in either case, as I see it, Kantian resemblance cannot be a matter of proportionality, given the foundational or productive role of transcendental conditions of knowledge. A detailed explanation of this twofold relation between transcendental conditions and empirical knowledge would have to employ the concepts of "reduction" and "realization"; see the important essay by Gerd Buchdahl, "Reduction-Realization: A Key to the Structure of Kant's Thought," in *Essays on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. J.N. Mohanty & R.W. Shahan, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1982. In this context, the attributive resemblance of the condition to the conditioned (as noted by Deleuze) would be a matter of "reduction," while the attributive resemblance of the conditioned to the condition (as noted in my text) would be a matter of "realization."

The third moment in the categorical history of philosophical universality is found in Whitehead's work, starting from *Process and Reality* (1929). It is essential to recognize that Whitehead, influenced by Thomas Aquinas and Kant, had to take a completely different path from Russell and his followers, starting from the *Principia Mathematica*. This path is best understood in reference to the metaphysical extension and transformation of Whitehead's earlier pre-metaphysical theory of "logical construction" (cf. *Adventures of Ideas*, Chapter IX, x).

This earlier theory is most clearly apparent in the version that Russell developed when expressing what he owed to Whitehead.<sup>19</sup> According to the way we now understand Russell's version, expressions like "the average family" are incomplete symbols, meaning that they neither name nor describe something directly, but rather they are constructions based on what can be observed. Such constructions express [18] truths about reality, for example, "the average family has 2.435 children," but there is nothing in reality that corresponds to them. Each statement about them can be translated into a set of statements about specific families, statements that are equivalent to them but do not say the same true things about the specific families as the logical constructions.

Russell employed his explanation of logical constructions as a weapon of empiricism against metaphysical realities and any inferred or postulated entities, i.e., against anything that cannot be the object of direct knowledge. As he stated, "Wherever possible, replace inferred quantities with logical constructions."<sup>20</sup> Thus, the status of logical constructions is conferred upon physical objects (based on sensory data), political states (based on their members), individuals (based on a multitude of sensations), classes, numbers, etc. In this way, all sorts of dubious entities could be redefined in terms of what we know for direct knowledge and therefore know indubitably, that is, they could be redefined as the material of a "logical construction, a complex assembly of immediately given objects."<sup>21</sup>

Whitehead was never happy with Russell's appropriation of the concept of logical construction, and he does not use this term in his later metaphysical works. Instead, he employs the notion of "intellectual," "imaginative," or "speculative" construction to describe his theory of occasions (cf. *Process and Reality*, Chapter 5). The significance of this redefined concept of construction cannot be underestimated.

## VII

As Whitehead states at the beginning of *Process and Reality*, chapter 1, for him a speculative construction has two sides: the "rational side" and the "empirical side" (PR 3).

The rational side is constituted by the "categorical scheme" (PR xi, 3-4). In contrast, the empirical side is defined as "everything of which we are aware as objects of enjoyment, perception, will, or thought" (PR 3), or as "ideas and problems constituting the complex texture of civilized thought" (PR xi). In other words, the subject matter that is subject to a categorical scheme is the empirical world, defined as the problematic and naturalistic mass of concrete objects, interpreted based on past and present beliefs and interpretations.

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, George Allen and Unwin, 2nd revised edition, 1926, p. 7-8, 70 sq. A vivid and highly significant account of one of Whitehead's most fundamental ideas can be found in "Portraits from Memory" by Bertrand Russell, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1956, p. 39: "The conceptions of the universe of Pythagoras and Plato were informed by mathematics, and I followed them eagerly. Whitehead was the serpent in this paradise of Mediterranean clarity. He once said to me, 'You think the world is what it appears to be at noon when it's sunny; I think it's what it appears to be at dawn when one awakens from deep sleep.' I found his remark horrifying but couldn't see how to prove that my way of seeing was better than his. Finally, he showed me how to apply the technique of mathematical logic to his world in a way that wouldn't shock the mathematician, by dressing it up in Sunday best. I was delighted with the technique he taught me because I didn't require naked truth to fare as well as truth dressed in its finest mathematical Sunday clothes." This Proustian theme of awakening and the indeterminate, penumbral world that surrounds the "vacillating" consciousness (cf. PR 15,267) lies at the heart of Whitehead's concept of the relation between philosophical analysis and its object, and it originates in his reading of F.H. Bradley, William James (cf. PR 50), and Bergson, as will be seen later. For some conceptual connections between Proust, Whitehead, and modern literature, see Edmund Wilson, "Axel's Castle," Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1931.

<sup>20</sup> Bertrand RUSSELL, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", in *Mysticism and Logic*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1917, p. 155.

<sup>21</sup> Bertrand RUSSELL, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 119.

This means, first and foremost, that the Whiteheadian concept of the empirical world should not be confused with the indubitable data of the senses of empiricists like Russell, nor with the indeterminate immediate experience of idealists, or even with the life-world of phenomenologists (that is, it is not a complex of primitive meanings prior to any reflexive or scientific conceptualization). Rather, the concept of the empirical world refers to everything of which we are aware - doctrines and slogans as well as cabbages, sealing wax, medicines. The philosophical construction begins with "assemblage" in this inclusive sense (MT 2-3).

Constructing the concept of the empirical as being a matter of the inclusive assembly performed by the philosopher of everything he must consider<sup>22</sup> has the significant advantage of making it evident that the distinction between scheme and world must not be defined in the manner of its critics such as Davidson.<sup>23</sup> That is to say, the empirical world should not be regarded as a neutral given in relation to a theory that the categorical scheme organizes or constructs and to which it thereby gives us access. Consequently, the distinction between scheme and world is not here a matter of any epistemological distinction between given and interpreter, and thus it does not imply, which would be nonsensical, that there is something other than the familiar world in which we actually exist.

Another advantage of this inclusive definition of the empirical is that it readily concedes that metaphysical discourse, like any form of discourse, is tied to persistent objects of reference - something that critics of event-theoretic approaches, such as Strawson, fail to see. When he states that "the category of process-things is a category we do not have and do not need,"<sup>24</sup> his mistake is that he interprets these concepts as either ingredients of the world ("realities") or principles of empirical identification. Clearly, the status of such concepts is the key question, but, as we shall see, they cannot be defined in these terms.

Secondly, the concept of the empirical world, if understood as including our past and present beliefs, is a historical concept, designating both the "oceans of facts" and the "evaluative interests" that are "intrinsic to every historical period" (MT 25). This means, first of all, that the [20] philosopher works within a historically situated ensemble of interests, orientations, and attitudes characteristic of a given era, and what they seek in relation to this assemblage is a "thread of coordination" (MT 25), a coordinating framework for "coordinating the common expressions of human experience, in everyday language, in social institutions, in actions, in the principles of various specialized sciences, highlighting harmony and resolving disagreements" (AI 286).

However, the coordinating generality of philosophy should not be confused with any kind of ahistorical neutrality or permanence. Indeed, thirdly, if the empirical world is a historically situated assemblage, the categorical scheme that analysis employs is also situated in history. This does not mean that the historical relationship between the scheme and the world should be understood as a matter of analysis of "absolute presuppositions".<sup>25</sup> Rather, for Whitehead, the construction of a philosophical scheme of categories is an enterprise of "imaginative generalization," involving "the use of specific notions that apply to a restricted group of facts to guess at the generic notions that apply to all facts" (PR 5, cf. 13). What he means here is that, in the "order of research," the empirical world is historically related to the categorical scheme as a source of analogy for defining the nature of reality. When the main features of the empirical world are analyzed or coordinated philosophically, this is done through the analogical use of one or another of its characteristics, which, due to the efforts, tensions, discoveries, and difficulties of a specific historical period, are seen as particularly important or opportune. This is how terms such as "mind," "matter," "events," "occasions," etc., are employed. These terms do not refer to particular traits; rather, culturally and historically saturated traits of the world, notable carriers of convergences in art, politics, physics, and technology, are generalized as analogues to characterize its main features in a coordinated manner. From this perspective, Whitehead's ambitions are transparent: his scheme of categories combines the nineteenth-century discovery of the constitutive nature of history in human experience with the twentieth-century developments in physics where matter is understood as the order and succession of spatio-temporal events. Throughout, he is guided by aesthetics (cf. RM

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<sup>22</sup> The Whiteheadian concept of "assemblage," which actually implies the assertion that the philosopher actively constructs his own problematic, is very close to Bergson's analysis as examined by Deleuze in "Bergsonism," op. cit., chapter 1.

<sup>23</sup> See Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in *Enquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, pages 183-198. For an example of the influence exerted by Davidson, refer to Richard Rorty, op. cit., chapter 1.

<sup>24</sup> P.F. STRAWSON, *Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*. Methuen, London, 1959, p. 57.

<sup>25</sup> For the theory of "absolute presuppositions," see R.G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics*, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1940.

91, ESP 129-131), by the way in which modern artwork is understood: it does not represent something, but rather unfolds internally and realizes its own significance in the event that is its activity. [21]

To construct a categorical scheme, to create concepts (FR 15-27), consists first and foremost in building coordinating analogies based on the singularities of historical experience.<sup>26</sup>

Now, what philosophy does with the analogically constructed scheme of categories is to attempt to demonstrate its "application" (cf. PR, Part II) to the empirical world. In other words, the success with which a categorical scheme can demonstrate its analogical adaptation or correspondence to the empirical world determines its value as a scheme, that is, its suitability for a philosophical analysis of the "order of reality."

It is clear, however, that what needs to be analyzed here is how the concept of analogical application, adaptation, or correspondence of a categorical scheme should be understood in the context of the theory of immanent difference. In this context, what is the relationship of the concept of analogically constructed categories to the questions of philosophical universality? Can it be anything other than a different form of the metaphysics of representation and identity? To answer these questions, we must briefly examine Whitehead's categorical analysis of the process of occasions.

## VIII

A characteristic feature that distinguishes Whitehead's concept of "occasions" from Heidegger's or Deleuze's "event" is that "occasions" are analyzed in terms of "process," meaning they are serial relations or, more precisely, vectorial connections.<sup>27</sup> While the later Heidegger carefully avoids any analysis of event connections, and Deleuze cautiously adheres to the doctrine of external relations<sup>28</sup>, both of them thinking of Hegel precisely where they most need to confront him, Whitehead seeks to remove the entire theory of relations from externalism, Russellian empiricism, and the monism that post-Kantian idealists like F.H. Bradley believed to be the necessary consequence of [22] the doctrine of internal relations. The title of his principal work, *Process and Reality*, clearly demonstrates his intentions: it constructs a metaphysics as Bradley did in *Appearance and Reality* (1893) and engages in a critique of the monistic metaphysics of presence or identity, of which Bradley was the last consciously problematic example in the British tradition.<sup>29</sup> In fact, Whitehead develops this critique on the basis of the very doctrine that the idealists had made their own—the doctrine of internal relations.

This is seen most clearly by recalling that, for Whitehead, there is nothing that is a simple occasion because an occasion is nothing more than an intermediate movement of becoming from what precedes to what follows. It is "what is never really" (PR 82-84), as in becoming it does not exist, and its completion is a disappearance. It is a site of transition, a relational connection, or a "passage" (AI 303), an "inheritance route" (PR 181)—a character that is most accurately described as combining the empiricist notion of subjective givenness with the idealist notion of constructive activity, situating them on a horizontal plane as "phases" or "stages" of an occasion. An occasion, indeed, has a direct experience of past occasions, but the significance or "status" (AI 226) of the antecedent givenness is "decided" (PR 43) by the occasion itself in its becoming. Therefore, an occasion relates internally to its antecedents, but its antecedents do not have internal relations to it, meaning that the internal relations of an occasion are serial or asymmetric in nature. While Russell held that the asymmetry of serial relations destroyed the doctrine of internal relations and, with it, Bradley's monism<sup>30</sup>, Whitehead's analysis maintains internal relations within the context of a pluralistic theory of asymmetric difference. The Whiteheadian concept of the vectorial process of

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<sup>26</sup> One will find, among other things, a brilliant analysis of the rule of analogy in the history of modern philosophy in Gerd Buchdahl's book *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins - Descartes to Kant*, 2nd ed., University Press of America, New York, 1988. Another central treatise can be found in his book *Kant and the Dynamics of Reason*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1992.

<sup>27</sup> A detailed and excellent analysis of Whitehead's categories and concepts can be found in J.-C. DuMONCEL's work, as cited.

<sup>28</sup> See, in particular, M. Heidegger's "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1950, p. 63; Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet's *Dialogues*, Aammarion, Paris, 1977, Chapter I and footnotes.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. my article 'Process and Historical Crisis in F.H. Bradley's Ethics of Feeling' in *Ethics, Metaphysics and Religion in the Thought of F.H. Bradley*, edited by P. MacEwan. The Edwin Mellen Press. New York, 1992.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Bertrand RUSSELL, *Principles of Mathematics*. Cambridge University Press, 1903, § 212-216: "The Monistic Theory of Truth", *Philosophical Essays*, edition revue 1966. p. 131-146.

occasions is a concept of the nature of things involving lines of force in motion, interacting, which, as such, are rationally analyzable.

Whitehead analyzes the vectorial connectivity of occasions in terms of the analogy of "feeling." In this regard, he draws from two different sources: F.H. Bradley's theory of feeling (cf. AI chap. xv) and Bergson's concept of intuition. For Bradley, the theory of feeling as a non-relational unity forms the basis of his monism.<sup>31</sup> For Bergson, intuition is always the intuition of [23] indivisible differences. However, what they have in common is their conception of feeling, a characteristic conception of the late 19th century, as intellectually inaccessible and distorted by the apparatus of rational analysis defined in terms of rational ideality in the case of Bradley or in terms of spatialization in the case of Bergson.

Whitehead agrees with Bradley and Bergson to the extent that he does not consider experience primarily as a matter of knowledge of objects.<sup>32</sup> Instead, he refers to his philosophy as a "cosmology" because he sees all things as self-actualizing. He universalizes the idealistic concept of "construction," no longer restricting it to the cognitive activities of the knowing subject, but defining it in terms of vectorial connections of feeling that only involve conscious reflection in exceptional cases (Cf. PR Part III).<sup>33</sup> One of the main points of his categorical scheme is to emphasize the conscious subject's capacity to recognize and define itself as just an element in a complex process of differentiation, no more and no less than a particularly sophisticated case. As he puts it, "Philosophy is the self-correction by consciousness of its own initial excess of subjectivity" (PR 15; cf. MT 146-147).

However, in contrast to Bradley and Bergson, Whitehead believes that feeling can be analyzed in terms of "prehensions" or qualitative intensities of feeling - whether conscious or otherwise - which constitute the way in which occasions are concretely coming together, apprehending antecedent occasions. He refers to this as his "critique of pure feeling" (PR 113). What kind of analysis is involved here? Whitehead describes the analysis of occasions as differential movements of concretion or becoming, which he refers to as "genetic division" (PR 283):

"The analysis of an occasion is purely intellectual... In analysis, it can only be apprehended as process... as passage" (PR 227).

Or, as he states elsewhere, in genetic division, the occasion "*is seen as a process*" (PR 283, emphasis added). In other words, he considers the categories of analogical or speculative construction to be [24] conceptually necessary distinctions. The categorical scheme is thus a set of virtual distinctions or what he calls "distinctions of reason" (PR 290) required by the problematic of becoming - a problematic that is not, as in Kant, purely theoretical, nor, as in medieval philosophy, concerned with the nature of exceptional realities, but, as noted earlier, understood in terms of the historically situated entirety of experience.

Once the historical virtuality of the categorical scheme is recognized, its nature and status as a mode of philosophical analysis can be easily defined.

Firstly, the categories of the scheme are transcendental in the strong medieval sense: they refer to everything that exists, not just the nature of cognitive representation. Clearly, no transcendental subreption is involved here due to their historically virtual character. Thus, Whitehead can easily and explicitly replace the transcendental concept of "being" with that of "creativity" (PR 21).<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. my article "F.H. Bradley's Metaphysics of Feeling and Its Place in the History of Philosophy," published in *The Philosophy of F.H. Bradley*, edited by A. Manser and G. Stock, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, pages 227-242; and my article "Relations, Intelligibility, and Non-Contradiction in F.H. Bradley's Metaphysics of Feeling: A Reinterpretation," published in *Archives de Philosophie*, volume 54, 1991, pages 529-551, and volume 55, 1992, pages 77-91.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. my article "The Critique of Pure Feeling : Bradley, Whitehead and the Anglo-American Metaphysical Tradition" in *Process Studies* 14, 1985, p. 227-242.

<sup>33</sup> The Whiteheadian concept of feeling gives superiority to affirmation over negation, as noted by Gilles Deleuze (in *Le Pli*, op. cit., pp. 110-111). Whitehead's source here is the critique of Hegel by Bradley, which I discuss in my aforementioned article in the *Archives de Philosophie* 54, 1991, specifically on pages 548-551.

<sup>34</sup> On this point, see RL. Fez, "Creativity: A New Transcendental?," in *Whitehead's Metaphysics of Creativity*, edited by F. Rapp and R. Wiehl, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1990, pp. 189-208. Regarding the ambivalence of Bradley's theory of feeling as both quasi-transcendental and empirical, refer to my article cited in note 29 above. Additionally, I would add that the concepts of "beauty," "adventure," and "peace" developed by Whitehead towards the end of AI may be the only significant

Secondly, however, the categories of the scheme are transcendental in the derived Kantian sense that they are transcendental conditions. This means that they should be understood not as virtual properties of things but as virtual conditions of things and their properties.

However, thirdly, in contrast to Kant, the categories of the scheme are conditions not of knowledge but of the nature of self-actualizing or differentiating things. This means not only that the categories are not what is realized, but also that they are not principles of realization or production, that is, they do not refer their subjective empirical reality outside of themselves to something that would be their cognitive or other foundation.

We will come back later to the significance of this latter point. For now, it is evident that in the third phase of the categorical history of philosophical universals, the concept of the categorical has been redefined. The transcendental scheme of Whiteheadian categories constitutes a *transcendental cosmology*. While the medieval thinkers conceive being as such in terms of its representable conditions, and Kant thinks being in terms of its conditions of representation, Whitehead, on the contrary, thinks being [25] as a creative novelty in terms of its historically virtual conditions of self-actualization.<sup>35</sup>

From this perspective, the category of occasion can no longer be mistakenly taken as a concept of minuscule, imperceptible existents. Contrary to what is commonly thought, occasions are not metaphysical individuals, and there are no identical entities corresponding to them in the empirical world. Instead, they are conditions of individuation, or what Whitehead calls "individualization," to be understood as arising from the movement and differentiation of prehensions or qualitative intensities of feeling (cf. PR 20, 55-56; AI 262). As with the synthetic unity of apperception, occasions have no empirical counterpart, and they leave no empirical trace or residue. They are not real particulars but rather realities of transcendental analysis.<sup>36</sup>

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developments in the analysis of transcendental properties since the Middle Ages. One could consider Whitehead's development of the concept of "intelligible beauty" here; for more on this concept, see Umberto Eco, *Art and the Middle Ages*, translated by M. Carruthers, Yale University Press, New Haven Connecticut, 1986.

<sup>35</sup> It is now evident that Whitehead successfully achieves the intention attributed to him by Dumoncel: "Whitehead... opens up to the philosopher a true promised land that he no longer dared to hope for: the prospect of a transcendental philosophy without idealism!" (Archives de Philosophie 47, 1984, p. 584). To my knowledge, Dumoncel is the first to have recognized Whitehead's transcendentalism, which I have attempted to explain textually and historically based on its origins, connections, contrasting nature, and contemporary implications. This interpretation resolves the problems that have arisen in the analysis of the genetic process. For example, consider the difficulties encountered by William A. Christian in his book *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1959, p. 80-81), and by John B. Cobb Jr. in "Freedom in Whitehead's Philosophy" in *Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy*, edited by L. Ford and G.L. Kline (Fordham University Press, New York, 1983, p. 45-52, especially p. 51).

<sup>36</sup> It should be noted that three particular obstacles have hindered the recognition of Whitehead's transcendentalism. The first is his statement that an occasion "possesses a certain quantum of physical time" (PR 283), which led some to believe that occasions are quantitative realities. However, this ignores the fact that (a) extensive continuum is a concept of indeterminate extension that Whitehead himself compares to Kantian forms of intuition, with indeterminate spaces and times (PR 72, cf. 66). (b) The actualized quantum of a completed occasion is itself not a determined quantity or volume, but a determinable, a condition for quantification. It has an indefinite potentiality for quantification and is what makes spatiotemporal determination possible without being an empirically determined spatiotemporal volume (PR 97, 332-333). The analysis is entirely transcendental. It is worth remembering that when one of his students asked him about the dimension of an occasion, Whitehead would smile, hold his thumb and index finger about an inch apart, and say, "Oh, about that much!" The second obstacle encountered is Whitehead's concept of God, which seems to inappropriately enter into this analysis. However, Whitehead denies that he is trying to prove the existence of God (PR 343). He argues that, contrary to what Nietzsche and his disciples think, there is nothing preventing the redefinition of the concept of God, like other concepts, within the context of a theory of immanent difference. Here, Whitehead follows Kant in recognizing that not only are descriptions of the nature of God virtual, but also that in metaphysics the concept of God has a virtual status, which is the best possible approximation of its meaning. The third obstacle is the category of "eternal objects," which is often interpreted as a realistic theory of universals, despite Whitehead's repeated protests in this regard. In terms of theory of knowledge, he is a moderate realist or a "conceptualist" (PR 40). However, his immanentism must be understood in the context of the category of eternal objects as an analysis of the conditions that make connectives or universals possible. It is clear, however, that these three questions are all complex and difficult, and each one must be addressed at length and separately.

## IX

It is now possible to understand the role of analogy in Whitehead's new definition of the concept of categorical scheme as an analysis of difference.

Firstly, the analogical correspondence between the categorical scheme and the empirical world is a matter not of corresponding terms, as in the case of Kant, but of corresponding relations. It has the character of an analogy of proportionality rather than attribution, as Whitehead indicates throughout (cf. PR 116, 117, 177, 212, 246; MT 231, AI 242). What he calls the "substitutive" relation between the scheme and the world (PR 116; cf. UA chap. 1) is not *a priori* relation as in Kant, nor a relation of reduction as in Russell. There is no foundation-consequence relation here. Rather, a theory of self-actualization conditions must necessarily be conceived in terms of a non-causal, commutative relation with the empirical, a relation of virtual reflexivity (as it can be called) in which the incomplete symbols of the categorical scheme (cf. PR XI) can be translated into their empirical subjective matter without any kind of productive implication or priority. For Whitehead, the algebraic relation of variable and value is the closest or analogous model for this concept of analogical application (cf. ESP 127 sq.).

Clearly, the "order of reality" has not been grasped here as a matter of resembling series of an eminent term or a principle of production, nor in terms of any kind of participatory principle that confers on the nature of things the identity of a mimetic ontological structure. Rather, the analogy of proportionality is, in Whitehead's hands, merely a specific principle of translation. Not only does it allow the translation of the empirical subject matter of analysis into a set of categorical statements that say equivalent things, but not the same things, about their subjective matter as it can be empirically posited; but also the relation of equivalence is a relation of strict equivalence, without any etiological residue remaining on the categorical side. Thus, the concept of "reality" must be understood as a matter of the strictly equivalent or virtually reflexive relation, analogically proportional, between the transcendental conditions of the process and the empirical world.

Therefore, when Whitehead considers his own objection, quoted above, implying that "our doctrine seems to have destroyed the very basis of rationality," he can respond, with a simplicity and candor that are truly disarming: [27]

We can begin our investigation from another point; that is, we can understand the process and then consider the characterization of individuals, or we can characterize individuals and conceive of them as formative of the process at hand. In truth, the distinction is merely a matter of emphasis (MT 135).

In other words, the distinction is a virtually reflexive distinction of reason. In this perspective, it is evident that the strongly "realistic" language of process philosophy is not the discourse of traditional metaphysical realism but of a transcendental cosmology of self-actualization, where - depending on the case - categorical concept and empirical object, "conceptual" analysis and "realistic" description merge into each other in the reflexive relationship of analogical translatability without crossing the line of virtuality. Whitehead's analysis must always be read with a dual focus, as a simultaneous elaboration of transcendent meaning and empirical application (PR xiii; cf. xi, xiv, UA 12). The realism of transcendental cosmology is a virtual realism.

Secondly, it is only within the context of an analogically constituted transcendent cosmology that radical fallibilism becomes possible, allowing a categorical scheme to recognize its revisability and even availability (cf. PR 9). This is something entirely different from Nietzsche's self-contained relativism, which describes its own claims to truth as nothing more than situated perspectives. Such perspectivism is actually inclusive with respect to itself. However, it is not properly fallibilistic, as it only understands fallibility in its own terms, i.e., as a matter of perspectival difference. In contrast, genuine fallibilistic perspectivism must be able to qualify the truth of perspectivism itself, as otherwise it would deny, in the case of competing theories, precisely what it affirms about them when defining them as perspectives, namely, constituting situated apprehensions of reality. What is required here is an account of the internal experience of truth-seeking, which can only be found in the Whiteheadian concept of analogical construction.

Indeed, what an analogical construction seeks in its application or probative substitution is compatibility - nothing more, nothing less. However, compatibility does not claim exclusivity (PR 274-275). On the contrary, an analogical construction is, first and foremost, capable of clearly seeing itself as an alternative coordinating principle among many others, within a given epoch, whether analogous or different (PR 8). In fact, a particular analogy or set of

analogies, understood as such, in the nature of the case, is a line, conscious of its [28] partiality and incompleteness, drawn through the inclusive assemblage of historical experience (PR 11). Secondly, the relation of translatability between an analogical construction and the empirical world necessarily requires what Whitehead calls a "leap of imagination" (cf. PR 13). This means that there is always a perceived play, an underdetermination, between the analogical construct and its empirical subjective material. Evidently, this is the real character of all philosophical systems, even if it is not acknowledged. However, by placing the reader in the midst of an inexhaustible network of relational categories, allowing them to choose their own mode of approach, their own points of reference, and their scales of application (cf. PR 286), Whitehead is the first philosopher to consciously develop an *unfinished system*, essentially incomplete and incompletionable<sup>37</sup> - a system of differentiation that produces difference. It is in this special sense that, after Whitehead, we must understand analogical construction as the form through which reflection expresses the fact that the explanandum is always more than the explanans. It is only in this way that reflection is capable of combining compatibility and fallibility, of saying "what is truly" without in any way pretending to the "pathetic" status of a "final metaphysical truth" (ESP 125).

We can thus conclude that, through a redefinition of the nature of speculative construction as an analogical scheme of transcendental cosmology, Whitehead accomplishes an extraordinary task: making the language of novelty and difference speak through the apparatus of traditional metaphysics. The concept of the categorical (along with its analogous concepts such as "forms," "generic concepts," and their "examples") and the concept of analogy are both so transformed that they are liberated from the philosophy of representation, whether realistic or idealistic, and can be understood as the virtual principles of transcendental cosmology. If Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics revealed the metaphorical character of concepts, Whitehead's transcendental cosmology rediscovered the conceptual power of metaphors. This is a complete reversal of Platonism - but it is carried out from within metaphysics and in the name of metaphysics.

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<sup>37</sup> On the concept of the "unfinished work," see Umberto Eco, *The Open Work*, translated by Anna Cancogni, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1989, Chapter 1.