“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”
–Alfred North Whitehead

Prehension: Is Experience Fundamental?

Brendan Graham Dempsey and I connected again to continue our discussion, this time focusing on Whitehead’s concept of “prehension.” I explained that, contrary to Ken Wilber’s placement of the concept in the upper left (individual-interior) quadrant of his AQAL map, prehension does not entail just an internal or subjective experience. It’s a transformative process where objects become subjects, embodying a dynamic interaction or bridge between what are normally considered distinct realms. The concept of prehension is novel precisely because it seems to overcome the traditional divide that modern philosophy often draws between the inner world of human experience and the outer world of causal interactions.

I also explored the connection between prehension and consciousness, emphasizing that Whitehead views most experiences as non-conscious. Consciousness, for Whitehead, is a higher-grade experience that emerges from the complex contrasts achieved in certain occasions. This perspective aligns somewhat with emergentist theories, which suggest consciousness arises from the intricate interplay of non-conscious elements. It’s just that on Whitehead’s reading, the “germ” of consciousness was already there.

We discussed how experience manifests at different scales of reality. For instance, at the atomic level, I suggested that atomic experience is akin to the aesthetic joy of a musical chord. There is something self-justifying about each of the vibratory harmonies achieved at various frequencies along the periodic table. In the case of plants, I pointed to the way a sunflower tracks the Sun across the sky as an example of prehension in action. Prehension is also exemplified in the photosynthetic process whereby environing sunlight and carbon dioxide molecules are transformed into the energy required to sustain plant-life.

Overall, I emphasized the importance of a coherent metaphysical framework that uniformly applies across diverse realms, from physics to psychology. Whitehead’s philosophy, influenced significantly by the then newly emerging quantum and relativity theories as well as William James’ radically empirical account of human experience, strives to provide such a framework.

A particularly important aspect of our conversation concerned the concept of time. I suggested that time, from a Whiteheadian perspective, is a unifying element across various levels of experience and consciousness, offering a contrast to the traditional, objective view of time in physics. This approach advocates for recognizing time’s dual objective and subjective dimensions. It is the impossibility of treating concrete time in a merely objective or external way that is at least suggestive of a panexperiential ontology. Experience in the minimal sense is thus describable as the tension or vector transition between an inherited objectified past, the enjoyment of a subjective present, and an anticipated superjective future.

Comments

2 responses to “Prehension: Is Experience Fundamental?”

  1. Jacob Given Avatar
    Jacob Given

    I’ve been thinking about this topic for the past week or so. I stumbled onto a series of debates between Philip Goff and Sean Carroll, each representing panpsychism and physicalism respectively. Based on my casual viewing of those videos and the little reading I’ve done on it, it seemed that the argument was essentially between consciousness as a more fundamental reality than physicality (Goff’s view, I think… it was hard to tell exactly) and consciousness as a weakly emergent property of physical interactions (Carroll). Goff’s constant refrain was “you haven’t explained consciousness by describing the physical interactions that underpin it because my experience of consciousness exceeds those interactions.” I’m not sure how you get consciousness as a fundamental principle out of that insight though. I’m sure I’m butchering the argument.

    Anyways, it got me thinking about the distribution of experience at various levels and the potential for something like a world soul. What’s not clear to me is how to sort out the directionality of cause whether fundamentally physicalist (matter–>increasing complexity that results in consciousness) or idealist/quasi-theist or idealist (consciousness–>physicality–>emergent bound consciousness). The latter scheme starts to look theological at that point, mapping almost exactly onto Whitehead’s theology, which isn’t necessarily a problem for me, but I do wonder if my theist intuitions are obscuring a problem that demands argument to solve.

    Not in the right environment to watch the video, but did read the post. I’ll watch it sometime soon when I can listen closely. In the meantime, I’m curious what you think about the metaphysical priority of matter.

    1. Matthew David Segall Avatar

      I find those Goff v. Carroll debates frustrating! I would not want to affirm either of their positions. “Consciousness” is not what I’d want to claim goes all the way down, though I do agree with Goff that standard physicalism just doesn’t cut it as an explanation of what we call consciousness at the human level.

What do you think?