“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”
–Alfred North Whitehead

Between the Speculative and the Prosaic: Life, Imagination, and Individuation

Timothy Jackson and I went deep into descendental philosophy and aesthetic ontology, core concepts developed in my last book Crossing the Threshold (2023).

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I try to argue against both scientistic neutrality and dogmatic theology. I believe that any attempt at thinking the most general conditions of reality inevitably touches the spiritual. If it did not then natural science would suffice and metaphysics would be superfluous. One of the premises of descendental philosophy is that our imagination is irreducibly cosmotheanthropomorphic. Our task as metaphysicians and as scientists is not to purge but to discipline and these anthropomorphisms, keeping mythopoetic language in play without letting it legislate. 

Process-relational ontology (a.k.a. ontology as an account of ontogenesis) implies ontological pluralism: all philosophizing begins amid a buzzing democracy of fellow co-creators, with no Sky Daddy beyond experience that we might crib to impose fixed Universals or Laws upon the living flux. Metaphysics after the confrontation with nihilism is the search for shared sources of vital intelligibility that invite us into novel forms of togetherness without ever pretending to subsume otherness once and for all. Metaphysics must become synonymous with continual life reform, enabling a process of ongoing (trans)personal individuation as an antidote to politico-theological capture.

See also my earlier essay:

Metaphysics Today

Ultimately Tim and I are asking a surprisingly practical question that sits underneath arguments about science, spirituality, and politics: how do we make sense of a world that is constantly changing without pretending we can stand outside it? In other words, what can metaphysics still do for living, learning, and acting together?

First, we both agree there is no “view from nowhere.” Every claim about reality is made from somewhere by embodied persons with histories, needs, and hopes. Second, facts and values aren’t cleanly separable: what we notice as “fact” is already shaped by what we care about. Third, the right scale for moral and political life begins with persons in relationship, not with ready-made universal formulas. This is where Sloterdijk’s idea of “life-reform” helps: before we reach for grand revolutions or party platforms, we need practices that change how we live, perceive, and relate, habits that contribute to the always ongoing work of natural and cultural renewal.

In affirming an “aesthetic ontology” I’m saying that reality only shows up through appearances, images, and felt meanings. Imagination isn’t make-believe but how worlds get made. To say the world is made of images is to say it is made of value-facts or fact-values. 

“Firstness” (Peirce) points to sheer, unfiltered presence before we fit it into reasons; Tim thinks staying close to this kind of particularity, especially in contact with nonhuman life, keeps philosophy honest.

Rather than treating a unitary physics as the one true bottom layer, we explore how biology’s feel for differentiation, adaptation, and historical genesis can teach physics something about time and the production of novelty.

Comments

One response to “Between the Speculative and the Prosaic: Life, Imagination, and Individuation”

  1. Finlay Avatar
    Finlay

    This was an amazing conversation. Always good to listen to the Matt and Tim show.

    I think an important part of what Matt is getting at is said well by Whitehead in Modes of Thought. Namely that philosophy is the attempt to render Milton’s “Lycidas” into prose. In other words, like the poet, the philosopher must point beyond langauge to that fuzzy irreducibility of feeling which characterises firstness, or pure duration, however you may want to say it. For myself the langauge of religion helps me feel philosophy in my bones, like Matt said, once people get to the end of process and reality and see Whitehead’s discussion of God they’re like “ohhh, that’s what he was saying.”

    But I also see Tim’s point of view, especially from a pragmatist/deleuzian stance. What are the concepts DOING. For example, Heidegger created a slew of unforseen concepts for the purpose of stripping the loaded context/etymological use of terms such as “substance,” “God” etc. What the concept of “The imagination of God” (Which frankly, isn’t Spinozist because imagination is a negation in Spinoza.) is DOING may engender in me a warm fuzziness which allows me to more deeply connect with the text; it may maximise importance to use the language from Modes of Thought, but it also conflates scientific discourse with the mytho-poetic in such a way which could reduce the efficacy of either. Although I do, like Matt, believe that science and religion is a bit of a false dichotomy, I also see that as descriptions of reality, it takes a bit of sleight of hand to make them flow into each other particularly well.

    Regardless, I think there is a middle way between these two views, which was nice to see the two of you gesture toward in the end of the conversation.

    Looking forward to more!

What do you think?